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Abstract
The Brexit referendum to leave the EU and Trump’s success in the US general election in 2016 sparked new waves of dis-
cussion on nativism, nationalism, and the far right. Within these analyses, however, very little attention has been devoted
towards exploring the transnational ideological circulation of Islamophobia and anti-establishment sentiment, especially
amongst diaspora and migrant networks. This article thus explores the role of the Indian diaspora as mediators in pop-
ulist radical right discourse in the West. During the Brexit referendum and Trump’s election and presidency, a number of
Indian diaspora voices took to Twitter to express pro-Brexit and pro-Trump views. This article presents a year-long qual-
itative study of these users. It highlights how these diasporic Indians interact and engage on Twitter in order to signal
belonging on multiple levels: as individuals, as an imaginary collective non-Muslim diaspora, and as members of (populist
radical right) Twitter society. By analysing these users’ social media performativity, we obtain insight into how social me-
dia spaces may help construct ethnic and (trans)national identities according to boundaries of inclusion/exclusion. This
article demonstrates how some Indian diaspora individuals are embedded into exclusivist national political agendas of the
populist radical right in Western societies.
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1. Introduction
This article explores the role of British and American-
based Indian diaspora supporters for Brexit and Trump.
It begins by introducing how the Brexit referendum to
leave the European Union and Trump’s campaign and
presidency in the US (both which at times deliberately
targeted the Indian diaspora) utilised populist radical
right rhetoric to galvanise support on social media. In
response, the emergence of pro-Brexit and pro-Trump
social media movements based on identitarian member-
ship, such as ‘Sikhs for Britain’ and ‘Hindus for Trump’, as
well as the establishment of advocacy organisations such
as the Republican Hindu Coalition in the USwhich openly
supported Trump’s candidacy, reveals some diasporic In-
dians as proponents of populist radical right ideas.
One legacy of Indian diaspora politicalmobilisation in
theWest is largely based on Hindutva (or Hindu national-
ism), an ideology that promotes the superiority of Hindu
civilisation from the threat of IslamandMuslim ‘invasion’.
Hindutva resonates amongst a diaspora keen to preserve
their Hindu identity by cultivating a long-distance nation-
alism that foregrounds belonging ‘back home’ whilst still
creating a sense of collective identity amongst diaspora
communities in the West. Sikh and Christian Indian dias-
pora groups have likewise successfully mobilised in com-
munity building efforts that aim to highlight their reli-
gious identities in Western multicultural societies. Con-
sequently, non-Muslim Indian diaspora activism has at-
tempted to distinguish a boundary against the Muslim
‘other’, building on Islamophobic anxiety prevalent in a
post-9/11 era. This article thus posits that anti-Muslim
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 77–89 77
anxiety, and anti-establishment sentiment (who are held
accountable for pro-Muslimpolicies), are core issues that
motivate such Indian diaspora communities to support
populist radical right agendas.
Following a year-long qualitative study of Indian di-
aspora Twitter users who express pro-Brexit and pro-
Trump views, this article highlights their engagement in
political discourse within the Brexit and Trump Twitter-
sphere(s). Their interactions help (re)produce key issues
and rhetoric within the populist radical right online mi-
lieu. Importantly, these users incorporate an ‘integration’
narrative to justify their positioning as ‘good immigrants’
inWestern societies (as opposed to non-‘integration’ ten-
dencies of Muslims). By doing so, these diasporic Indi-
ans provide insight into how online spaces may help con-
struct meanings of ethnic and (trans)national identities
according to boundaries of inclusion/exclusion.1
This article highlights online Indian diaspora support-
ers for Brexit and Trump by situating their expressions
of Islamophobia and anti-establishment sentiment in or-
der to embed themselveswithin the populist radical right
agenda of exclusionary nationalism in Western societies.
By illuminating what may be assumed as paradoxical
political views of an ethnic minority demographic, this
article contributes towards understanding and explain-
ing their support for populist radical right ideology in
the West.
2. “The Most Imminent and Urgent Threat and
Problem That Faces This Country, Namely Open-Door
Immigration, and the Security and Social Implications
of It”—Nigel Farage1
Ideologically, the populist radical right promotes a com-
bination of ethno-nationalism, xenophobia expressed
as cultural racism, and anti-establishment populism
(Rydgren, 2005, 2017). National identity is conflated
with a distinct cultural identity rooted in an ethnic
past; the populist radical right seeks to ‘preserve’ na-
tional culture by keeping separate different cultures,
i.e., ethno-pluralism. The contemporary threat of ethno-
pluralism is the apprehension that Islam—and conse-
quently, Muslims—is the fundamental ‘other’ in West-
ern societies. Therefore, the populist radical right holds
“a visceral opposition to, and demonization of Islam”
and consequently, “immigrants from Muslim countries”,
whom are viewed as threatening to national values
(Kallis, 2015, p. 28; Rydgren, 2007, p. 244) in the post-
9/11 era. The populist radical right criticises the ‘elite’
political and media establishment for failing to ade-
quately resolve issues such as immigration, integration,
and (ethno-)national identity, using Islam as a place-
holder to articulate these grievances.
Whilst demand and supply factors help explain the
emergence and success of the populist radical right, in-
cluding political opportunities and increasing discontent
and disaffection with governing institutions and parties,
the role of mass media is also key in disseminating pop-
ulist radical right discourses and agendas towards awider
audience (Kallis, 2013; Rydgren, 2005). The transnational
diffusion of ideas and practices made possible through
media and communication technologies reflects a piv-
otal shift in populist radical right platforms. The effect is
a growing global wave that has taken root across numer-
ous locales:
[S]trong points of ideological and political conver-
gence have started to crystallize, turning the radical
right into a truly transnational European and occasion-
ally trans-Atlantic force...The topicality of a new range
of issues, such as immigration, international terror-
ism, national sovereignty, globalization…have created
a political milieu that has allowed the radical right not
only to thrive but also to unite its otherwise disparate
and fragmented forces. (Kallis, 2015, p. 28)
This noteworthy phenomenon describes the appeal, and
at times, success, of populist radical right movements
and parties. In the case of the UK Independence Party
(UKIP)-backed Brexit campaign and Trump’s election and
presidency, both presented issues that resonated with
similar demographics, but delivered them according to
local narratives.
During the 2016 referendum campaign for Britain’s
membership in the EU, UKIP seized the opportunity
to combine its Eurosceptic platform with disdain for
Westminster. UKIP took a tactical approach by attack-
ing the establishment for failing to address issues of im-
migration and integration—escalated by sensational me-
dia coverage of the refugee crisis. Indeed, then UKIP
leader Nigel Farage “blamed state multiculturalism for
the rise of home-grown terrorism in Europe” (Kallis,
2015, pp. 34–35), citing the metropolitan elite for en-
acting policies that created ‘parallel lives’ and hence, Is-
lamist extremism within communities. In doing so, UKIP
portrayed Muslims as a ‘fifth column’ within British soci-
ety who were a threat to national security, but more im-
portantly, national culture. By linking potential extrem-
ist activity of future refugees to past integration pol-
icy failures, UKIP promoted a discourse of fear in the
present. Given UKIP’s stance as the party which claimed
issue ownership on immigration (seeGoodwin&Milazzo,
2017), its referendum rhetoric built on pre-existing anxi-
eties surrounding uncontrolled borders.
During the campaign, UKIP employed an extensive
social media strategy for Vote Leave. The party signifi-
cantly used Twitter’s infrastructure as an avenue to gar-
ner support for Brexit, including the ability to broad-
cast the party’s platform to users instead of the main-
stream media; setting the discursive framing of the
Leave camp; building on previous Eurosceptic move-
ments to create a broader coalition; and providing the
appearance of democratic representation in the polit-
ical realm. Yet, there was “substantial focus on mobi-
1 Nigel Farage speech, 29 April 2016.
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lization of existing supporters, rather than converting
new ones” (Usherwood & Wright, 2017, p. 380). Pro-
Brexit Twitter users engaged in diffusing information to
ideologically similar users, thus creating online “polar-
ized in-groups” as had also occurred in the 2015 gen-
eral campaign (Segesten & Bossetta, 2016, pp. 14–15).
This phenomenon reflects what are termed “ideological
cyberghettoes” (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 4) or
“homogeneous affective echo chambers” in which indi-
viduals selectively expose themselves to sources that re-
inforce their political opinions (Himelboim et al., 2016,
p. 1395). The extensive use of Twitter bots by the pro-
Brexit side additionally helped generate targeted content
(Howard& Kollanyi, 2016). In short, UKIP exercised an im-
pressive social media strategy during the EU referendum
that helped ensure its populist radical right message had
reached an intended audience.
With parallels in rhetoric and strategy to the UKIP-
backed Vote Leave campaign (Wilson, 2017), Trump’s
campaign likewise galvanised support employing a pop-
ulist radical right narrative throughout the US national
election the same year. Whilst a majority of Trump’s pol-
icy proposals were not radical, the campaign’s rhetoric
was outwardly hostile towards governing political insti-
tutions (Eiermann, 2016). In a study of Trump’s Twitter
following, for example, Wang, Niemi, Li and Hu (2016)
found that attacks on the Democrats (i.e., the incum-
bent political party) received the most “likes”; in short,
anti-establishment sentiment was amotivating factor for
Trump supporters who were largely disaffected with the
governing status quo. Further, Trump’s use of informal,
direct, and provocative language on Twitter helped con-
struct and normalise the image of a homogenous nation
threated by the dangerous ‘other’ (Kreis, 2017). More re-
search on the Trump campaign’s social media strategy is
needed in order to effectively evaluate the extent of on-
line support for populist radical right discourse, although
it has been noted how Trump disrupted the norms of
election campaigning on social media (Enli, 2017).
3. A New, Growing Base?
It seems paradoxical (and rare) that ethnic minorities
and/or immigrants would support populist radical right
platforms. As such, there exists very little research on
these supporters. Two exceptions are case studies in
Sweden and the Netherlands.
The Sweden Democrats (SD) is an ethno-nationalist
party with roots in Swedish fascism. Pettersson, Liebkind,
and Sakki (2016) found that ethnic minority and/or immi-
grant SD politicians had complex, fluid, and multifaceted
identity constructions. Often revealed was a “discursive
tension between an assigned immigrant or ethnic minor-
ity identity on the one hand, and an asserted Swedish
identity on the other” (Pettersson et al., 2016, p. 637).
By presenting themselves as a ‘good immigrant,’ these
politicians reinforced the narrative that immigrants need
only to work hard to succeed and will ultimately be ac-
cepted in society. As such, ‘elite’ liberals were viewed
as pandering to immigrants who are assumed to “not
think for themselves” and who are, importantly, non-
national (Pettersson et al., 2016, pp. 637–638). Mulinari
and Neergaard (2018) similarly found that migrant ac-
tivists in the SD describe individual stories of hard work
as a means of successful integration, as opposed to as-
sumed cultural differences or unwillingness of new mi-
grants to assimilate into Swedish culture. Combinedwith
this narrativewas opposition to Islam that feared newmi-
grants ofMuslim backgroundwould create “enclave soci-
eties” and foster the “Islamisation of Sweden” (Mulinari
& Neergaard, 2018, p. 14).
In the Netherlands, Roopram and van Steenber-
gen (2014) analysed Hindustani2 voters of the Freedom
Party (PVV), a populist radical right party with a strong
anti-immigration and anti-Islam platform. Whilst some
Hindustani PVV voters promoted a “work ethos” dis-
course citing concerns of immigration as an economic
burden on the welfare state, others feared Islam as
a cultural threat to the Netherlands (Roopram & van
Steenbergen, 2014, pp. 56–57). The latter spoke of Is-
lamist radicalisation and extremism, connecting histori-
cal and cultural narratives of past Muslim rule in India to
the contemporary threat of “Islamization” of Dutch soci-
ety (Roopram & van Steenbergen, 2014, pp. 55–56). This
is key as it signals how global Islamophobic tropes can op-
erate and adapt to local contexts, and ultimately, bolster
support for populist radical right ideology in the West.
If we are to consider how the SD and PVV appeal to
ethnic minorities and/or immigrants, then such insight
might also apply to pro-Brexit and pro-Trump Indian di-
aspora supporters. Islamophobic and anti-establishment
views promoted by the Vote Leave campaign and
Trump’s campaign and presidency likely resonated with
some diasporic Indians3. Yet, the articulation of populist
radical right ideas amongst the diaspora is grounded
within a historical legacy of anti-Muslim sentiment. The
next section highlights the evolution of Indian diaspora
political mobilisation in the UK and US as framed accord-
ing to non-Muslim identity building.
4. Building a Minority Identity
The performance of diasporic identity is a way of simul-
taneously constructing imaginaries of the homeland and
of creating a minority identity outside India. For many
within the Indian diaspora, the formation of a minority
identity in Western societies is construed along religious
lines as reflected in the historical and contemporary pol-
itics of nation-building on the subcontinent. Although
political mobilisation and activism of Hindu, Sikh, and
2 Hindustani refers to Hindus, Muslims, and Christians who migrated as indentured labourers from India to Suriname, and then to the Netherlands.
3 Based on polling data, 33% of British South Asians voted for Brexit in 2016 (Ashcroft Polls) and 16% of Indian Americans voted for Trump in the US
national election (National Asian American Survey).
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Christian communities in the West has alleviated these
religious tensions carried over with the diaspora, one is-
sue remains stark in the post-9/11 era: their distinct fram-
ing as non-Muslim religious identities.
Hindutva (or Hindu nationalism) ideology and its or-
ganisations have a historical legacy amongst the Hindu
diaspora in the UK, US, Canada, the Caribbean, and east-
ern and southern Africa (Bhatt & Mukta, 2000, p. 435)4.
Whilst joining in Hindutva activities is a way of building
socio-cultural capital with others (Mathew & Prashad,
2000, p. 524), it more importantly provides comfort to
a diaspora seeking to define itself in the West (see Bhatt,
2000). The demand from migrants to educate their chil-
dren in Hindu traditions (Jaffrelot & Therwath, 2007) re-
flects an attempt to reconnect with the ‘culture’ of ‘back
home’. Hindutva organisations seize upon this opportu-
nity to present a version of Hinduism that can accommo-
date the diasporic experience.
The shift tomulticulturalism as a policy agenda in the
West has had a profound impact on diasporic Hindutva
organisations, whether serving as ethnic lobbies in party
politics, or adopting a human rights discourse in terms
of a victimhood narrative (Bhatt, 2000, p. 580; Jaffrelot
& Therwath, 2007; Kamat & Mathew, 2003; Therwath,
2012; Zavos, 2010, p. 12). In the UK, these organisa-
tions regularly feature in British government policies re-
lated to diversity, multiculturalism, and community co-
hesion in the name of religious and cultural plurality
(Zavos, 2010, p. 18). Self-described umbrella organisa-
tions campaign on issues of Hindu representation in the
public sphere, thereby institutionalising (and essential-
ising) Hindu identity (see Anderson, 2015). In post-9/11
America, Hindutvamanifests as a religious lobby to policy
makers and legislators, as Hindu advocacy organisations
frame their agendas according to US national interest.
They distance themselves from the Muslim ‘other’ and
exploit anti-Islam sentiments whilst simultaneously pro-
claim its critics as “Hinduphobic” (Kurien, 2006, 2016). Di-
asporic Hindutva becomes a mediator of transnational
ideological manifestations of anti-Muslim anxiety, albeit
adapted to local contexts. It is thus the outcome of a
highly politicised agenda that combines transnational
and multicultural identity politics.
In addition to diasporic Hindutva, Sikh and Christian
diasporas have also played a prominent role in politi-
cal mobilisation in the West. Of relevance is the rise of
some Sikh activism surrounding the narrative of Mus-
lim grooming gangs in the UK, which allegedly target
Sikh girls for conversion to Islam (Singh, 2017). For these
Sikhs, such cases “often feeds on existing historical nar-
ratives and contemporary Sikh/Muslim tensions” which
reinforce Muslims as a threat to non-Muslim commu-
nities in Western societies (Singh, 2017, p. 6). Indeed,
the issue of Muslim grooming gangs (further explored
below), has created alliances between diasporic Sikhs,
Christians, and Hindus, with counter-jihad organisations
such as the English Defence League, to promote an anti-
Muslim agenda (Lane, 2012). In a move towards pop-
ulist radical right support, such ideological connections
have expanded to include issues such as immigration.
In Thorleifsson’s (2016) research amongst British Sikh
Brexiteers, for example, support for restrictive immigra-
tion policies was articulated in order to maintain historic
Anglo-Indian links. In the context of the Brexit referen-
dum, not only (dominantly Muslim) migrants from the
refugee crisis, but Eastern European migrants from the
EU were viewed as not ‘culturally’ belonging to Britain’s
national imagined community. Here, British Sikhs evoked
a nostalgia for Commonwealth and empire that they per-
ceived as an entitlement for immigrant status.
A lacuna remains in how some diasporic Hindus,
Sikhs, and Christians, united by the othering of Islam/
Muslims as an approach to integration, translates into
support for populist radical right agendas. The follow-
ing section details a year-long qualitative study of Indian
diaspora Twitter users who express support for Brexit
and Trump. It posits that anti-Muslim anxiety and anti-
establishment sentiment are core issues that motivate
such users.
5. Methodology
Unlike a large number of studies conducted on Twitter
that mainly incorporate a quantitative approach with
data collection (Ampofo, Anstead, & O’Loughlin, 2011;
Barbera & Rivero, 2014; Freelon & Karpf, 2014; Froio
& Ganesh, 2018; Hartung, Klinger, Schmidtke, & Vogel,
2017; for an exception see Tromble, 2016), this article fo-
cuses on a qualitative design that aims to capture the na-
ture of Twitter activity and interactions of users. Thirty-
nine Twitter account users were manually chosen of di-
asporic Indians living in the UK and US who express pro-
Brexit and/or pro-Trump political opinions, whether in
the form of tweeting original content, retweets, and/or
replies to other users. Data collection included dias-
poric Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians as a way of empir-
ically demonstrating expressions of anti-Muslim Indian
identity in the West. At times, Sikh and Christian dias-
pora users did express disdain for Hindutva, but these
users distinguished themselves by explicitly asserting a
non-Muslim identity. Their deliberate discursive identi-
fication reveals how individuals in the Indian diaspora
choose to actively distance themselves from Muslims.
Hence, these Hindu, Sikh, and Christian Indian diaspora
users help reconstruct the myth of Muslim ‘otherness’ in
an effort to politically integrate in Western societies.
The location of accounts collected was determined
by listed profile information and/or tweets that origi-
nated with British or American content which signaled
deeper familiarity of local issues (this ran the risk of
assuming knowledge was linked to place of residence).
What was certain was that accounts had to contain po-
4 For more on Hindutva organisations in the UK and US see Kamat and Mathew (2003), Mathew (2000), Mukta (2000), Raj (2000), Rajagopal (2000),
Therwath (2012), van der Veer (1994).
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litical content that favoured Brexit (not exclusively UKIP)
and/or Trump (not exclusively Republican). Although a
small number of users tweeted solely about Brexit or
Trump, a large majority of accounts contained overlap-
ping material of both. (If accounts additionally tweeted
Hindutva material this was a bonus, but not a necessary
condition, especially considering that Sikh and Christian
users were also analysed in the sample.) By exploring
users who tweet simultaneously about Brexit and Trump,
this allowed for a convergent rather than a comparative
analysis at a transnational scale.
Lastly, account users were both individuals and or-
ganisations, although a majority belonged to the former.
Some accounts belonged to leaders, activists, or advo-
cates, whilst others to non-affiliated individuals. The num-
ber of followers or levels of tweeting activity were not as
significant as much as participating, i.e., producing con-
tent, in the pro-Brexit and pro-Trump Twitter network.
The rationale for this selection was to determine how
users perform their online political identities. Accounts
that had never tweeted, however, were disregarded for
the sample. Over time, some account users did change
privacy settings to protected tweets and data collection
of users ceased unless tweets were made public again.
Others had changed Twitter handles or to entirely new
accounts, making it difficult to track accounts at times.
Table 1 details the type of user accounts, for which
two and seven are organisations in the UK and US, and
thirteen and seventeen belong to individuals, respec-
tively. The number of tweets for each account type is
given rounded to the nearest thousandth, as is the num-
ber of followers5.
We can already note two characteristics of users.
Firstly, a majority of account users comprise of individu-
als rather than organisations. Second, individuals tweet
at a greater frequency than organisations, despite a ma-
jority with less than 5,000 followers (yet, it is only in-
dividual accounts that have more than 10,000 follow-
ers). Based on these characteristics, we can infer that
although organisations serve as mobilising agents, it is
clearly individuals that act as mobilisers in the Twitter-
sphere. The findings discussed below indicate how these
individuals establish an online presence whichmoves be-
yond quantitative impact, towards performing a discur-
sive political identity.
From April 2017 to April 2018, NVivo’s NCapture
software was used to scrape entire timelines of the se-
lected Twitter accounts, providing the first to most re-
cent tweet of each user. Scrapes were downloaded ev-
ery two weeks and analysed within four chronological
phases, with phase I including tweets collected from
April 2017 to July 2017, phase II from July 2017 to Octo-
ber 2017, phase III from October 2017 to January 2018,
and phase IV from January 2018 to April 2018. By allow-
ing for a longitudinal study to prevent bias from data col-
lection during one phase, analysing the data according to
phases allowed to observe shifts, if any, in issue salience
over time.
6. Findings
6.1. Employing Populist Radical Right Discourse
Utilising NVivo software tools, the word frequency of
tweets was extracted, inclusive of stemmed words, e.g.,
‘vote’ and ‘voting’. Figures 1 to 4, reflective of each phase,
display a word cloud generated by NVivo of the most
commonly used words in tweets.
Clearly, the word ‘Trump’ (as well as the president’s
Twitter handle) was the most frequent word within
the tweet collection across all phases. Other frequent
words included: ‘people’, ‘vote’, ‘Clinton’, ‘Obama’, ‘Mus-
lim’, ‘election’, ‘Islam’, ‘media’, ‘liberal’, etc. Visualising
word frequency in a word cloud is useful as it indi-
cates common topics discussed on Twitter. Word fre-
quency shifted in relation to current political events dur-
ing the Brexit referendum and subsequent negotiations,
as well as Trump’s campaign and administration. How-
ever, as indicated in the figures, word usage tended to
remain consistent across all phases. This repetition of lan-
guage is key as it reflects how users choose to display
themselves according to what Papacharissi (2011) de-
scribes as “a networked self”, whereby users construct a
self-identity within “converged mediated environments”
(p. 309) such as Twitter. Twitter becomes:
A sense of place…formed in response to the particu-
lar sense of self, or in response to the identity perfor-
mance constructed upon that place. This presents the
modus operandi for the networked self, and the con-
Table 1. Breakdown of Twitter account users by type of account, country, number of tweets, and number of followers.
Country Tweets Followers*
Type of Account UK US 0–1,000 1,000– 5,000– 10,000+ 0–1,000 1,000– 5,000– 10,000+5,000 10,000 5,000 10,000
Organisation 2 7 4 4 1 0 4 4 0 0
Individual 13 17 4 9 13 4 12 10 0 4
Note: *5 accounts (1 organisation and 4 individuals) were deleted in the period following data collection and the collation of the table.
The number of followers for these accounts is unknown.
5 To protect anonymity of account users.
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Figure 1. Phase I: April 2017 to July 2017.
Figure 2. Phase II: July 2017 to October 2017.
Figure 3. Phase III: October 2017 to January 2018.
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Figure 4. Phase IV: January 2018 to April 2018.
text of newer patterns of sociability and routes to so-
ciality that emerge. (Papacharissi, 2011, p. 317)
Here, we can see that users continue to perform a partic-
ular identity over time by engaging in a discourse—or “a
semiology that affords connection” (Papacharissi, 2011,
p. 317)—as constituted within a Twitter community.
In order to explore how certain words were used
in context, however, five themes reflective of populist
radical right discourse (as discussed in Section 2), and
speculated issues of concern for Indian diaspora users
living in the UK and US were selected. These five
themes—that were further categorised by subtheme—
include: 1) ‘immigration’ (including the subthemes ‘ille-
gal’; ‘refugee’; ‘rape’; ‘multiculturalism’); 2) ‘foreign pol-
icy’ (including the subthemes ‘EU’; ‘India’ and/or ‘Modi’6
and/or ‘BJP’7); 3) ‘establishment’ (including the sub-
themes ‘Clinton’; ‘Obama’; ‘Democrats’; ‘Labour’; ‘lib-
eral’ and/or ‘left’; ‘media’ and/or ‘BBC’ and/or ‘CNN’);
4) ‘Islam’ (including the subthemes ‘Muslim’; ‘terrorism’
and/or ‘extremism’; ‘ISIS’); and 5) ‘Indian’ (including the
subtheme ‘Hindu’). Rather than employing NVivo soft-
ware to algorithmically determine themes (i.e., codes),
the coding scheme was inductively developed by assess-
ing tweets in the preliminary stage of data collection.
Given that users tweeted about local political context
and/or issues, e.g., refugee crisis in Europe or CNN cov-
erage of Trump, a qualitative coding manual was cre-
ated to reflect users’ topical interests. Instead of cod-
ing all the topics discussed by users, codes pertained
to populist radical right discourse; the exceptions were
tweets discussing ‘India’/‘Modi’/‘BJP’, as this indicated
awareness of Indian politics, and tweets including ‘In-
dian’/‘Hindu’ as markers of ethnic identity. Tweets were
coded to one ormore themes/subthemes, depending on
the content of the tweet. Throughout a year of data col-
lection, a total of 185,580 English-language tweets were
manually coded.
To examine the nature of the relationship between
themes, a NVivo-generated cluster analysis as displayed
in Figures 5 to 8 provides a visual representation of
themes/codes clustered together based on words in
common. NVivo generates a cluster analysis of word sim-
ilarity using the Pearson correlation coefficient as a met-
ric. The result is a diagram that clusters codes together
if they have many words in common. In short, Figures 5
to 8 show that themes which share a branch contain the
same words as used in tweets. By conducting a cluster
analysis for each phase, we can again observe how con-
versations shift over a year, but now relating to themes.
Based on the cluster analysis in Figure 5, we can in-
fer, for example, that the theme of ‘multiculturalism’ is
frequently used in tweets referencing the British Labour
party, as well as the role of the ‘BBC’ and the ‘EU’ in rela-
tion to ‘Labour’. In Figure 6, this shifts to include the ‘es-
tablishment’. This is likely due to the policy mandate of
the centre-left political andmedia establishment onmul-
ticulturalism, and subsequently how critics place blame
on its failure. In Figure 7, however, tweets about ‘multi-
culturalism’ and the ‘establishment’ shifts towards con-
versations focusing on ‘ISIS’, ‘refugees’, ‘Islam’, ‘terror-
ism/extremism’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘rape’. This indicates that
no longer is a single political party being targeted, but
all mainstream political parties which are designated as
the ‘establishment’. Additionally, anti-Muslim sentiment
becomes the primary articulation for criticism of multi-
culturalism. But, in Figure 8, ‘establishment’ disappears
and once again, ‘BBC’, ‘EU’, and ‘Labour’ are prominently
featured within tweets, only this time in relation to Is-
lamophobic discourse. Thus, the centre-left political and
6 Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India.
7 The Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist political party, which is the ruling party in India led by Modi.
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Figure 5. Phase I: April 2017 to July 2017.
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Figure 6. Phase II: July 2017 to October 2017.
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media establishment remains over time the primary op-
position for these Indian diaspora users, who are in turn
reinforcing populist radical right ideology.
Similarly, ‘left/liberal’ is often initially referenced in
tweets that also discuss ‘Islam’ and ‘terrorism/extrem-
ism’, which in turn, is also related to the branch of tweets
that reference ‘refugee’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘rape’. But again,
this shifts after six months as ‘left/liberal’ is then used
almost exclusively in tweets that refer to ‘Democrats’,
‘Clinton’, and ‘Obama’ for the last two phases. This
change is due to a surge in Twitter activity as the Trump
administration increasingly targets the Democratic Party
for opposing policy changes.
The relationship between these branches of tweets
thus highlight not only how certain populist radical right
narratives circulate in online conversations, but also how
these conversations shifted over a year-long period in re-
sponse to current events. Tracing conversation dynamics
amongst users provides insight into how their articula-
tion of populist radical right discourse adapts to wider
socio-political conditions. Although all tweets were anal-
ysed combining UK and US-based accounts—that is,
convergently rather than comparatively—these two ex-
amples of themes highlighted above indicate country-
specific nomenclature. ‘Multiculturalism’ remains pri-
marily a British term, likely due to its popular usage in
the UK context, as opposed to ‘diversity’ as is common in
American parlance. Similarly, the ‘left/liberal’ theme sig-
nals greater usage in US-based tweets, given the greater
propensity to identify Democrats as liberals (vis-à-vis Re-
publicans as conservatives) in American popular under-
standing of the liberal/conservative dichotomy. This is
not to suggest all tweets within these two themes fall
neatly within national boundaries, however, but serves
as an indication based on volume. What is apparent is
that anti-Muslim anxiety becomes a continuous refrain
within both themes, thus suggesting how these users un-
derstand ‘multiculturalism’ and the ‘left/liberals’ in rela-
tion to fear of Islam/Muslims. The effect is a transnation-
alisation of anti-Muslim anxiety as a recurring trope.
Like the word clouds, the cluster analyses provide vi-
sual representation of the tweets at a general scale to
show the relationship between themes. Repetition once
again appears as a trend (e.g., anti-Muslim sentiment),
as the cluster analyses indicate that word similarity gen-
erally remains consistent between themes, with slight
changes taking place over a year’s duration. As such, we
can infer that these users tend to hold stable political at-
titudes in line with populist radical right ideology. The fol-
lowing section explores tweets of the ‘Muslim’ theme in-
depth in order to provide insight into how these users
conceptualise the notion of ‘integration’ through online
discursive performativity.
6.2. A Case of ‘Love Jihad’
By coding tweets according to word usage in conver-
sation, this explores how these Indian diaspora users
participate within Twittersphere culture and community.
But in order to situate conversation dynamics within
themes, this allows us to look in-depth at how issues are
framed in tweets. In tweets coded to the ‘Muslim’ theme,
for instance, Muslims are often characterised as violent,
especially with the aim to cause “destruction”8 in the
UK, US, and/or Europe more generally. Links to ISIS or
terrorist activity is frequently cited as a major concern
(as indicated in the cluster analyses above). Similarly,
Muslims are described as a “cancer” in relation to Islam
as a “poisonous ideology”. Further references to Islam in-
clude describing the ProphetMohammed as a pedophile
and rapist, and consequently, Western women as tar-
gets of “rape” or “sex slaves” by Muslims continuing Is-
lamic practice. Tweets also frequently describe Muslims
in reference to immigration. Portrayed as “cockroaches”,
Muslims are seen as invaders constantly “breeding” in or-
der to destruct Western/European “civilization”. Conse-
quently, they are viewed as foreigners who must be de-
ported. Following this line of logic, then, tweets usually
criticise the left (or “libtards”) and themedia (or “pressti-
tutes”) for their failure to seeMuslims along these tropes.
Depicting Muslims according to these negative represen-
tations fits into the populist radical right narrative. By
dehumanising Muslims as violent terrorists or ‘crimmi-
grants’, this reinforces an ‘otherness’ that is foundational
towards the ideological projection of exclusionary na-
tionalism. Here, these Indian diaspora Twitter users are
consciously embodying an image of non-Muslimness in
order to assert claims of national belonging.
Indeed, these Indian diaspora Twitter users choose
to emphasise a non-Muslim Indian identity in order
to differentiate themselves from Muslims. Users often
describe instances of “love jihad” in which not only
white Western young women, but also Hindu, Sikh, and
Christian girls are targeted by Muslim grooming gangs.
For instance, Rohan, a young British man of Hindu back-
ground, tweets:
“Horrible sexual grooming of Hindu girls in UK.”
A website link in Rohan’s tweet emphasises that
the perpetrators of these grooming—or “rape”—
gangs are young Muslim men who have also targeted
Hindu diaspora girls. Similarly, another user, Sikhs for
Britain, tweets:
“A Sikh group wants politicians to stop describing the
Rotherham grooming gang as ‘Asian’.”
8 Words in double quotation marks are direct usage as they appear across a majority of tweets. However, personal identifying information has not been re-
vealed and/or disclosed in the findings. Twitter user handles have been changed to protect anonymity, unless the account is managed by an organisation.
Similarly, any quoted tweets have been changed from the original, but still reflect the meaning of content, unless the tweet has been deleted by the user
in which case the original is quoted. Such alterations are necessary to ensure ethical compliance according to the Norwegian Centre for Research Data.
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Here, Sikhs for Britain refers to the Rotherham grooming
scandal in the UK, in which a group of British Pakistani
men had been targeting young girls for sexual exploita-
tion. This tweet highlights the need to distinguish the
perpetrators’ religious background (i.e., Muslim) as the
rationale for their actions.
Hence, these non-Muslim Indian diaspora users fear
being misidentified as Muslim in the West. They push to
be recognised for their religious identity and not an all-
encompassing ‘Asian’ descriptor. Such tweets are used
to justify Hinduism, Sikhism, and Christianity as religions
that dictate respect for law and order, tolerance, and
peace. The consequent representation is that Hindus,
Sikhs, and Christians—as opposed to Muslims who are
instinctively intolerant and violent—are well-integrated
in Western societies.
Further, many tweets on this issue target the po-
litical and media establishment with claims of Mus-
lim “appeasement” rather than protecting “innocent”
Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians. Jasjit, a Sikh activist in the
UK, tweets:
“Evidence that public officials withheld information of
sexual grooming to protect liberalism.”
By presupposing that government officials have a left-
ist agenda that prevents transparency on the issue of
grooming gangs, Jasjit reinforces a populist radical right
discourse of anti-establishment sentiment. Other users
also express this worldview. Rohan further tweets:
“The left clearly don’t give a s**t about organised
Muslim child grooming gangs targeting non-Muslim
children.”
Arjun, a young man of Hindu ancestry that converted to
Christianity, similarly tweets:
“Wow, lefty white racist lady on Twitter calls me un-
civilized for having an opinion on Muslim grooming
gangs.”
Lastly, Chetan, a young British Hindu, tweets:
“Grooming gangs prosper under political correctness.”
By denoting the political orientation of the establish-
ment as left-leaning, this serves as the basis for gov-
ernment officials to fail to address grooming gangs.
Using terms such as ‘political correctness’ serves to
augment the notion that multiculturalism policies pro-
moted by the establishment have failed to address the
concerns of non-Muslim Indian diaspora communities
who feel victimised but are largely ignored in the pub-
lic conversation.
Twitter serves as a site for these Indian diaspora
users to create a networked self, one simultaneously
built by fusing digitally networked action with personal
action frames. An opportunity arises on Twitter “inwhich
new public spaces opened up by media technologies
are spaces with an implicit potential to frame vigorous,
‘bottom up’ trajectories of autonomous action accompa-
nied by a strong sense of moral legitimacy” (Zavos, 2015,
p. 22). Tweeting about Muslim grooming gangs targeting
Hindu, Sikh, and Christian diaspora girls provides these
users “a strong sense of moral legitimacy” given what
they view as the failure of the political and media estab-
lishment to protect victims of abuse. By highlighting in-
tercommunity tensions within the diaspora, these users
reinforce the populist radical right narrative thatMuslims
will never be able to fully ‘integrate’ due to their funda-
mental ‘otherness’. Consequently, these users cultivate
their own sense of identity and belonging onmultiple lev-
els: as individuals, as part of a collective non-Muslim In-
dian diaspora, and as members of (populist radical right)
Twitter society.
7. Conclusion
This article highlights those in the Indian diaspora who
promote exclusionary nationalist political agendas in
Western, multicultural societies. It begins by situating
how the UKIP-backed Vote Leave campaign in the Brexit
referendum and Trump’s election in 2016 advanced pop-
ulist radical right discourse—in particular immigration
and integration—on Twitter as a strategy to target in-
tended audiences. Populist radical right discourse might
alienate ethnic minorities and/or immigrants, yet, case
studies in Sweden (with the SD) and the Netherlands
(with the PVV) reveal that such supporters do exist to pro-
mote these platforms. In particular, the ‘good immigrant’
myth of ‘integration’ remains a constant refrain amongst
supporters. Given previous, albeit limited, research on
this phenomenon, such insight might apply to pro-Brexit
and pro-Trump Indian diaspora supporters in the UK and
US. This article then provides a brief overview of anti-
Muslim Indian diaspora activism amongst Hindu, Sikh,
and Christian communities in the UK and US in order to
contextualise how these diasporic Indians, united by the
othering of Islam/Muslims as an approach to integration,
translates into support for populist radical right agendas.
It posits that anti-Muslim anxiety and anti-establishment
sentiment motivate Indian diaspora supporters of Brexit
and Trump.
This article subsequently presents a year-long qual-
itative research design of Indian diaspora Twitter users
who express support for Brexit and Trump. By exploring
users who tweet simultaneously about Brexit and Trump,
this allows for a convergent rather than a comparative
analysis at a transnational scale. As active users in polit-
ical conversations within the Brexit and Trump Twitter-
sphere(s), they help shape ideas, strategies, and agen-
das within the online milieu of populist radical right dis-
course. For these users, Twitter serves as a digital third
place, a networkedmedia environment that best reflects
what McArthur and White (2016, p. 1) describe as “sites
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of online sociality that both mirror and deviate from
physical gathering sites”, but can effectively create the
notion of a collective place for community gathering.
This article demonstrates the ways in which these
Indian diaspora Twitter users express support for Brexit
and Trumpby cultivating a discursive online performance
of a networked self. By highlighting their Hindu, Sikh, and
Christian Indian diasporic identities, these users situate
themselves as socially well-integrated in which they em-
phasise a non-Muslim identity that reproduces the no-
tion that Muslims are a problematic ‘other’. The political
andmedia establishment is similarly targeted for promot-
ing pro-Muslim policies at the expense of non-Muslim
communities in order to advance ‘political correctness’.
Thus, these users not only further populist radical right
narratives but help it adapt towards new boundaries of
inclusion/exclusion. This article sheds light on how such
practices amongst Indian diaspora individuals adds com-
plexity in their support for populist radical right agendas
in the UK and US.
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